The Only Permitted US Tungsten Hub the Pentagon Can Actually Buy From
The United States has zero operating tungsten mines. Zero domestic concentrate, zero active APT processing capacity, zero secured supply for armor-piercing penetrators, semiconductor deposition targets, or tungsten carbide tooling. China controls roughly 80% of global tungsten production and a higher share of ammonium paratungstate (APT) processing, the refined intermediate that every downstream defense and industrial use depends on. The Western world has four operating tungsten mines outside China: Almonty’s Panasqueira in Portugal and Sangdong in South Korea, and EQ Resources’ Mt Carbine in Australia and Barruecopardo in Spain. All four ship concentrate to processors in Asia or Europe. None feed a US-domiciled APT plant. Blue Moon Metals owns the only permitted one that exists. Springer, in Pershing County, Nevada. Permitted. Off Interstate 80. APT plant already on site. The institutional names already in the capital structure have done the work to confirm that this is the asset the Pentagon actually needs, and that the math closes.
Blue Moon Metals (Nasdaq: BMM, TSXV: MOON) is trading at $7.25 as of this afternoon, May 1, 2026. Market cap is $645 million. The company has generated zero revenue across every reported quarter. That gap between the market cap and the revenue line is not a red flag. It is the entire setup.
This is the public unveiling. Founders and paid subscribers got the pre-brief last week. Today the thesis goes wide.
I. Why This Moment Is Structural, Not Cyclical
China's antimony export ban went into effect in late 2024 and tightened through 2025. Antimony is a flame retardant, a battery component, and a hardening agent for lead in ammunition. The US military consumes it in volume. China supplies the majority of the world's antimony. When Beijing turned off the tap, the Western world had no immediate substitute.
Tungsten followed a parallel path. China controls approximately 80% of global tungsten production and an even higher share of ammonium paratungstate (APT) processing capacity. APT is the refined intermediate product that feeds into tungsten carbide tooling, armor-piercing penetrators, and semiconductor deposition targets. Without APT, you cannot make the hardest cutting tools in manufacturing. You cannot make the kinetic energy penetrators that NATO tank rounds depend on. The Western reshoring imperative is not a talking point. It is a procurement emergency.
The Defense Production Act Title III framework exists precisely for this scenario. DPA Title III authorizes the US government to provide direct financial assistance to domestic producers of materials deemed critical to national defense. Tungsten and antimony both qualify. The DoD strategic stockpile expansion program, running concurrently with the Trump administration's Section 232 tariff posture on critical minerals, creates a buyer-of-last-resort dynamic that did not exist five years ago. The government will pay above-market prices to secure domestic supply. That changes the economics of every permitted US tungsten and antimony asset.
Springer is a permitted US tungsten site. It sits off Interstate 80 in Pershing County, Nevada. It was formerly the largest tungsten mine in the United States. The APT processing plant is already on site. Blue Moon just confirmed its intention to construct the Springer mine, and simultaneously acquired nine additional claims from GoldPlay LLC and a private party for US$1 million in cash and shares, consolidating the district. You do not consolidate a district unless you intend to operate it as a hub.
The hub-and-spoke model is exactly what China built. One central processing facility. Multiple satellite mines feeding ore to the hub. APT output sold to downstream consumers at a price that reflects the processing monopoly, not just the mining cost. Blue Moon is copying that playbook on US soil, in a jurisdiction where the federal government is actively trying to pay someone to do exactly this.
This is a 5-10x position. The base case is $36. The bull case is $72. The work below explains why those numbers are conservative, not aspirational.
II. The Four Assets: What Blue Moon Actually Owns
Springer, Nevada. This is the near-term focus. Permitted site. APT plant already on site, which is a capital advantage that most tungsten developers do not have. The mine sits off I-80, which means logistics are solved. Blue Moon just acquired nine additional claims from GoldPlay LLC and a private party for US$1 million cash and shares, per the PR Newswire release from April 29, 2026. The district consolidation is the tell. You do not spend $1 million to consolidate a district you are not serious about operating. The hub-and-spoke model means Springer processes ore not just from its own ground but potentially from satellite deposits in the region. One commenter on X noted that a competing tungsten explorer three hours away "doesn't have a way to process the ore" and "will probably be sending it to BMM." That is the processing moat in plain language.
Burnt Cabin, Idaho. The antimony-silver asset. Grade is reported to be north of typical concentrate specification, which matters enormously in a post-China-export-ban world. Antimony concentrate buyers are desperate for non-Chinese supply. A high-grade US antimony deposit with permitting optionality is not a commodity asset. It is a strategic asset. The DPA Title III framework applies here too.
Apex, Idaho. Acquired from Teck Resources in exchange for an 8% equity stake in BMM. Teck did not give this away. They took equity in the acquirer, which means they believe in the platform. Apex carries germanium and gallium exposure alongside copper. Germanium and gallium are compound semiconductor inputs. They appear on the US critical minerals list. They are the same materials that feed into the III-V wafer supply chain that IQE plc (a name already on this board) depends on. The overlap is not coincidental. The US government's compound semiconductor defense supply chain runs through these materials. Apex is a DPA Title III candidate.
Nussir, Norway. The financial anchor. Blue Moon confirmed the Final Investment Decision to construct the Nussir copper-gold-silver mine in Finnmark, Norway. The feasibility study, reported by Yahoo Finance on April 29, 2026, outlines a 13-year mine life and projected annual cash flow of $77 million. Total project cost is $184 million. LNS is the mine construction contractor. The financing stack is the most important detail in this entire write-up, and it gets its own section below.
III. The Nussir Financing Stack: Who Is Actually in This Deal
This is where the thesis becomes undeniable. The pushback on BMM from people who have not done the work is that it is "just a commodity producer without chokepoints." Read the cap table. Then come back.
The Nussir financing structure, as confirmed through company announcements and the April 30, 2026 SEC filing, is as follows:
Hartree Partners and Oaktree Capital Management provided a $25 million bridge facility, of which half was drawn in September 2025. Hartree is a commodity trading firm with real balance sheet. Oaktree is one of the largest alternative credit managers in the world. They do not write bridge checks to pre-revenue developers without doing the work.
The equity component is capped at less than 20% dilution, with $20 million in equity financing. The senior secured debt tranche is $50 million. The precious metals stream is $70 million, structured as a Wheaton Precious Metals-style first-ranking stream on both Nussir and the Blue Moon project. Wheaton Precious Metals is the largest precious metals streaming company in the world. When Wheaton writes a $70 million stream, they have modeled the mine. They have stress-tested the feasibility study. They have priced the downside. Their presence is institutional confirmation that the project economics are sound.
Hartree also bought 526,617 additional shares at $9.06 per share, per the Stock Titan report from April 25, 2026. That is above the current price of $7.25. Hartree is not averaging down. They are adding at a premium to today's print because they believe the financing close will re-rate the stock.
The concurrent C$150 million bought-deal equity offering, announced alongside the Nussir FID and Springer construction intention, was subsequently upsized to C$163 million at $7.23 per share, per the April 30, 2026 SEC filing. A bought deal means the underwriters have committed to purchase the shares. This is not a best-efforts raise. The underwriters are on the hook.
The cap table reads: Teck Resources at 8%. Oaktree. Hartree. Wheaton. Altius Royalties. Baker Steel. LNS (the construction contractor). This is not a retail-driven junior miner. Every name on this cap table has a reason to want the mines built.
The math on Nussir alone: $184 million total project cost, $77 million projected annual cash flow, 13-year mine life. That is a 2.4-year simple payback on a project in Norway, which is a Tier 1 mining jurisdiction with rule of law, established labor markets, and grid power. The financing is largely in place. LNS breaks ground when the equity raise closes.
That is the financial anchor. Everything else is optionality.
IV. The Springer Thesis in Detail: China's Playbook, American Soil
The reflexive objection is: "Springer is just another tungsten mine. China can flood the market and kill the economics any time it wants."
That argument was correct in 2015. It is wrong in 2026.
Here is what changed. China's tungsten export controls are tightening, not loosening. The US defense procurement apparatus has concluded that single-source dependency on a strategic adversary for armor-piercing penetrator material is an unacceptable risk. The DoD strategic stockpile expansion is funded. DPA Title III grants are available. Section 232 tariffs on critical minerals create a price floor for domestic production that did not exist before.
Springer is not competing with Chinese tungsten on price. Springer is competing for a government contract to supply domestic APT to a buyer that has decided it will pay a premium for non-Chinese supply. That is a fundamentally different business model.
The APT plant already on site is the key detail. Building an APT processing facility from scratch costs tens of millions of dollars and takes years to permit. Springer has one. That is the hub. The nine additional claims acquired from GoldPlay LLC and Robert Schafe for US$1 million in cash and shares are the spokes. As the district consolidates, Springer becomes the only place in the western United States where you can take tungsten ore and turn it into APT. That is a processing chokepoint on American soil.
One more data point. The stock on X: "You know what's really crazy about this? $GMTL trades at 700M+ MC. A tungsten explorer that doesn't even have a PFS yet. They are far behind Springer and don't have a way to process the ore. Probably will be sending it to BMM 3 hours up the road." That is not Shawarma Capital analysis. That is a market participant who has done the work independently arriving at the same conclusion about the processing moat.
V. The Comp Set: Why BMM Is Mispriced
“The standard junior miner comp set is wrong for BMM. The right comps are Almonty Industries (NASDAQ: ALM, TSX: AII), which operates Sangdong in South Korea and Panasqueira in Portugal; EQ Resources (ASX: EQR), which operates Mt Carbine in Australia and Barruecopardo in Spain and is the closest pure-play Western tungsten comp on a per-mtu basis; USA Rare Earth (USAR), which is rebuilding a domestic critical minerals supply chain; and Lithium Americas (LAC), which trades at a significant premium to its net asset value on the basis of domestic strategic positioning and government support.”
The USAR analog is instructive for the policy re-rating mechanism. Domestic critical minerals producers with government backing and processing infrastructure on US soil trade at premiums that reflect strategic scarcity, not just commodity economics. Springer with its on-site APT plant deserves that same premium. It is not receiving it yet.
Lithium Americas is the closest structural analog for the government-backed developer re-rating. LAC secured a DoD loan commitment and re-rated sharply on the announcement, before a single tonne of lithium was produced. The mechanism was identical: domestic strategic supply, government buyer, processing infrastructure in a favorable jurisdiction. Springer is positioned for the same re-rating when the DPA Title III grant is announced.
The MP Materials analog is the aspirational case. MP rebuilt a domestic rare earth supply chain from scratch, secured DoD offtake contracts, and re-rated from a sub-$1 billion EV to over $3 billion. The mechanism was identical: domestic strategic supply, government buyer, processing infrastructure on US soil. Springer is not Rare Earth Mountain Pass. But the policy framework is the same, and the processing moat logic is the same.
VI. The Scenarios: Bear, Base, Bull, Moonshot
Every number in this section is a Shawarma Capital model output. These are not reported figures. They are analytical projections based on the confirmed project economics (Nussir feasibility study at $77M annual cash flow, $184M capex), the Springer APT plant optionality, and the policy tailwinds described above. Treat them as directional, not precise.
Bear case ($5.00, 10% probability). The C$163 million bought deal closes but Nussir construction hits cost overruns that push the total project cost materially above $184 million, requiring a dilutive equity raise. China reverses its tungsten export controls in a negotiated trade settlement, compressing APT margins before Springer reaches production. The DoD strategic stockpile program is reduced in a budget reconciliation. At $5.00, the equity is worth roughly $445 million, which prices in a delayed Nussir and reduced optionality on the US assets. This scenario requires multiple simultaneous adverse developments, which is why the probability is low.
Base case ($36.00, 45% probability). Nussir enters production in late 2027 or early 2028 on schedule and on budget. Annual cash flow reaches $65-77 million. Springer receives a DPA Title III grant and begins APT production in 2028. Burnt Cabin advances to a resource estimate. Apex attracts a strategic partner or government offtake interest. BMM re-rates to a 15-18x EV/EBITDA multiple on Nussir cash flow, with Springer and Apex as free optionality. At $36.00, the market cap is approximately $3.2 billion, consistent with the ALM and USAR comp set applied to a multi-asset platform with confirmed financing and institutional backing. This is a 5x from current levels.
Bull case ($72.00, 30% probability). Nussir performs at or above the feasibility study economics. Springer secures a DoD offtake contract and begins APT production ahead of schedule. The Section 232 tariff framework creates a domestic APT price premium of 20-30% above Chinese spot. Burnt Cabin antimony grades confirm at or above current estimates. BMM trades at a premium to Almonty on a per-pound-of-contained-metal basis, reflecting the processing moat and the US jurisdiction premium. At $72.00, the market cap is approximately $6.4 billion. This is a 10x from current levels and is supported by the MP Materials re-rating precedent applied to a multi-commodity critical minerals platform with processing infrastructure in two Tier 1 jurisdictions.
Moonshot ($144.00, 15% probability). The US government designates Springer as a strategic national asset under DPA Title III and provides direct capital support for expansion. Nussir cash flows are used to fund Apex development, which attracts a Wheaton-style germanium stream. BMM becomes the only vertically integrated Western tungsten-antimony-germanium-copper producer. The re-rating is driven by scarcity: there is no other company in the Western world with this combination of permitted assets, processing infrastructure, and institutional backing. At $144.00, the market cap is approximately $12.8 billion. This is the MP Materials outcome applied to a multi-commodity critical minerals platform at a moment when the US government has made domestic critical minerals supply a stated national security priority.
Probability-weighted expected value:
0.10 x $5.00 + 0.45 x $36.00 + 0.30 x $72.00 + 0.15 x $144.00 = $0.50 + $16.20 + $21.60 + $21.60 = $59.90
Against today's price of $7.25, the probability-weighted EV is $59.90. That is an 8.3x from current levels on a weighted basis.
Annualized IRR at base case over 3 years: approximately 71%. Annualized IRR at bull case over 3 years: approximately 115%.
The math is the math.
VII. The Cap Table Is the Thesis
Most junior miners have a cap table that reads: management, retail, a few small funds, and a lot of warrants. BMM's cap table reads differently.
Teck Resources holds 8% of the company, received in exchange for the Apex germanium-gallium mine. Teck is one of the largest diversified mining companies in the world. They did not take equity in a junior miner for fun. They took equity because they believe the platform has value and they want exposure to the critical minerals upside without operating the assets themselves.
Oaktree Capital Management is in the bridge facility. Oaktree manages over $180 billion in assets. Their credit team does not write bridge checks to pre-revenue developers without stress-testing the downside.
Hartree Partners is in the bridge, in the equity, and just bought 526,617 additional shares at $9.06 per share, per the Stock Titan report from April 25, 2026. Hartree is a commodity trading firm. They buy physical commodities and the companies that produce them. When a commodity trader adds to a position above the current market price, they are telling you something about where they think the commodity goes.
Wheaton Precious Metals wrote a $70 million stream. First-ranking on both Nussir and the Blue Moon project. Wheaton has done this hundreds of times. Their due diligence process is among the most rigorous in the mining industry. A first-ranking stream means Wheaton gets paid before the equity holders in a downside scenario. They priced that risk and still wrote the check.
Altius Royalties is on the cap table. Baker Steel is on the cap table. LNS, the mine construction contractor, is on the cap table. When the contractor takes equity instead of just a fee, they are betting on the project's success with their own capital.
This is not a retail-driven story. Every institutional name on this cap table has done the work. They are not here for the press releases.
VIII. The Honest Bear Case
This section exists because the bull case is not the only case.
Financing dilution. The C$163 million bought deal at $7.23 per share is priced essentially at today's market. That is not dilutive at current prices. But the total financing stack for Nussir alone is $184 million. The bought deal plus the stream plus the senior secured debt gets you there. If any tranche falls through, BMM needs to raise more equity. More equity at lower prices is the mechanism by which junior miners destroy shareholder value. This risk is real, and it is the primary reason the bear case exists.
Construction overruns. The Nussir feasibility study projects $184 million in total project cost. Underground copper mines routinely run 20-30% over budget. A $220-240 million actual cost against a $77 million annual cash flow is still a good project. A $280-300 million actual cost starts to stress the equity returns. LNS as contractor-equity-holder aligns incentives, but it does not eliminate execution risk.
Tungsten price elasticity. If China reverses its export controls and floods the APT market, Springer's economics deteriorate. This is the scenario that challenged the last generation of Western tungsten developers. The counter-argument is that the US government's DPA Title III framework creates a price floor through direct support. Government programs can be defunded, but the current political environment makes that outcome unlikely in the near term.
Antimony smuggling reroute. China's antimony export ban has already prompted rerouting through third-country intermediaries. If the effective supply of antimony to Western markets recovers through smuggling or rerouting, Burnt Cabin's strategic premium compresses. This is a real risk for the antimony thesis specifically, though it does not affect the tungsten or copper assets.
Norwegian permitting and community relations. Nussir is in Finnmark, in the far north of Norway. The project has faced environmental opposition related to fjord tailings disposal. The FID is confirmed, but permitting in Norway is not the same as permitting in Nevada. Community opposition can delay construction timelines.
Single-asset CEO concentration. Christian Kargl-Simard is the CEO. He is also the CEO of Adventus Mining. Running two development-stage companies simultaneously is a bandwidth question. It is not a disqualifying fact, but it is a risk factor worth naming.
Thin float. At 65.87 million shares in the float and 166,830 shares of average daily volume, this stock moves on small orders. The 52-week range is $3.47 to $8.63. That range tells you everything about the volatility profile. Position sizing matters here.
IX. The Catalyst Calendar: Next 12-18 Months
The bought deal close is the first gate. The C$163 million offering at $7.23 per share was filed with the SEC on April 30, 2026. Bought deals typically close within 3-5 business days of announcement. That puts the close in the first week of May 2026. When the cash hits the balance sheet, the Nussir construction timeline becomes concrete.
LNS mobilization at Nussir follows the equity close. Construction on a $184 million underground copper mine in Norway takes approximately 18-24 months from mobilization to first concentrate. That puts first Nussir copper in late 2027 to mid-2028.
Springer construction timeline is less defined. The intention to construct was confirmed concurrent with the Nussir FID. The district consolidation via the GoldPlay acquisition is complete. The next catalyst is a formal construction decision with a capex estimate and timeline. Watch for a press release in Q3 2026.
DPA Title III grant applications are open on a rolling basis. The DoD has been funding domestic critical minerals projects under this framework. A Springer DPA grant announcement would be a significant re-rating catalyst. No specific date is known, but the policy environment makes an application in H2 2026 logical.
The next earnings report is July 6, 2026. At that point, the bought deal will have closed and the cash position will reflect the full financing. The balance sheet will show approximately $93 million in existing cash plus the C$163 million raise, less construction draws. That is a well-capitalized developer.
Nussir feasibility study details will be published in full as part of the NI 43-101 technical report. The full report provides the resource estimate, the reserve estimate, the AISC figures, and the sensitivity analysis. That document is the foundation for any serious DCF model of the Norway asset.
Sulitjelma district combination with Alpha Future Funds is a non-binding LOI as of today. A binding agreement would be a catalyst. No timeline has been announced.
X. The Apex Angle: Compound Semiconductors and the Defense Supply Chain
This section is for readers who follow the IQE and compound semiconductor thesis families on this board.
Apex is an Idaho copper mine with germanium and gallium as byproducts. Germanium and gallium are the substrate materials for III-V compound semiconductors. GaAs, GaN, InP. These are the materials that go into defense radar systems, electronic warfare equipment, satellite communications, and high-frequency power amplifiers. They are also the materials that IQE plc grows epitaxial wafers on.
China controls the majority of global germanium and gallium production. In 2023, China announced export controls on both materials. The US government's response was to accelerate domestic sourcing under the DPA framework. Apex is a DPA Title III candidate for exactly this reason.
Teck Resources understood this when they structured the Apex transfer as an equity swap rather than a cash sale. Teck is a sophisticated mining company. They did not give Apex to BMM because it was worthless. They gave it to BMM because they wanted exposure to the platform that would develop it, and they wanted to clean up their own balance sheet of non-core assets simultaneously.
The Apex germanium-gallium angle connects the BMM thesis to the broader compound semiconductor defense supply chain thesis. If you have been following the IQE write-ups on this board, you understand why domestic germanium and gallium supply is not a niche concern. It is a defense procurement priority.
XI. The Capital Structure Walk
As of today, May 1, 2026: 89.03 million shares outstanding. Float of 65.87 million shares. Cash of $93.62 million. Debt of $15.64 million. Net cash of $77.98 million. Market cap of $645 million. Enterprise value of $572 million.
The reverse split for the Nasdaq uplisting is the reason the TSX Venture still shows 451 million shares while Nasdaq shows approximately 89 million effective shares. The split ratio was approximately 5:1. This is not a red flag. It is a standard mechanism for uplisting to a major US exchange with minimum price requirements.
The C$163 million bought deal at $7.23 per share adds approximately 22.5 million new shares at current exchange rates. Post-deal, shares outstanding will be approximately 111-115 million. The dilution is roughly 25% from current levels. That is meaningful. It is also the price of building a $184 million mine with institutional-quality financing partners.
The warrant overhang from prior financings needs to be quantified from the full NI 43-101 filing and the most recent management information circular. This is a gap in the current analysis. Before sizing into a full position, the warrant count and exercise prices matter.
The EBITDA TTM is negative $39.45 million. The FCF TTM is negative $19.73 million. These are the burn rates of a developer, not an operator. They will remain negative until Nussir enters production. The cash position of $93.62 million, plus the C$163 million raise, provides runway through construction.
XII. Position Sizing and the Portfolio Context
The intended allocation here is approximately 35% of the portfolio. That is a large number. It warrants an explanation.
The book runs two buckets. Conviction names sized based on edge, where the work has been done and the thesis is clear. And an ETF sleeve, which is passive beta held as dry powder while waiting for asymmetric setups. When a name like BMM crosses the threshold, the ETF sleeve is the first thing that rotates. That is what it is there for. The single-name conviction positions, MRLN at 41.7% and IQE at 35.1%, are trimmed only marginally. The bulk of the BMM allocation comes from converting passive beta into a position where there is actual analytical edge.
At 35%, BMM becomes the third-largest position in the book. That sizing reflects the convergence of: a confirmed FID on a $184 million copper mine with $77 million projected annual cash flow, a permitted US tungsten site with on-site APT processing in a market where China controls 80% of global supply, a cap table that includes Teck, Oaktree, Hartree, Wheaton, and Altius, and a policy environment that is actively trying to pay someone to do exactly what Springer is positioned to do.
The thesis-invalidation triggers that would reduce the position: a Nussir construction cost overrun that blows through $250 million and forces a dilutive equity raise below $5.00; a reversal of US critical minerals policy that defunds DPA Title III and removes the government buyer from the Springer economics; or a management bandwidth failure at Kargl-Simard that results in a material operational miss at either Nussir or Springer. None of these is the base case. All three are monitored continuously.
The next 12-18 months look like this: bought deal closes in days, LNS mobilizes at Nussir in Q2-Q3 2026, Springer construction decision in Q3 2026, DPA grant application in H2 2026, Nussir first concentrate in late 2027 or early 2028. Each of those events is a re-rating catalyst. The stock does not need all of them to work. It needs Nussir to execute on schedule and Springer to receive a DPA grant. Those two events alone take the base case to $36.00.
You don't need to believe me. Read the cap table. Read the feasibility study. Read the DPA Title III framework. Then decide.
XIII. The Bottom Line
Blue Moon Metals is trading at $7.25 today. The probability-weighted expected value across bear, base, bull, and moonshot scenarios is $59.90. The base case alone is $36.00, a 5x from current levels. The bull case is $72.00, a 10x. The annualized IRR at base case over three years is approximately 71%.
The thesis is not complicated. Nussir is a confirmed-FID copper mine in Norway with $77 million projected annual cash flow, financed by Oaktree, Hartree, and Wheaton. Springer is the only permitted US tungsten site with an on-site APT plant in a market where China controls 80% of global supply and the US government is actively funding domestic alternatives. Burnt Cabin is a high-grade antimony asset in a post-China-export-ban world. Apex is a germanium-gallium copper asset acquired from Teck in a defense supply chain context.
The cap table is Teck, Oaktree, Hartree, Wheaton, Altius, Baker Steel, and LNS. The bought deal is C$163 million at $7.23 per share, filed with the SEC on April 30, 2026. The construction contractor holds equity.
Springer would be the only US-domiciled APT hub. There is no second. The institutional names in this capital structure have concluded that the hub gets built, that it gets built here, and that the processing moat on American soil is worth owning at any price below the re-rating. The probability-weighted math says $59.90. The current price says $7.25. That gap is the position.
Position accordingly.
Disclosure: Long BMM. Intended position size approximately 35% of portfolio, third-largest behind MRLN at 41.7% and IQE at 35.1%. Building on weakness. Thesis-invalidation triggers: Nussir construction cost overrun forcing dilutive equity raise below $5.00; reversal of US DPA Title III critical minerals policy removing the government buyer from Springer economics; management bandwidth failure resulting in material operational miss at Nussir or Springer. This is research synthesis, not investment advice. You should not buy or sell securities based on anything I write. I am not a registered investment advisor. I do not owe you a fiduciary duty. My conclusions could be wrong in ways I have not anticipated. Financial projections are model outputs based on publicly available data. They are not guarantees. Do your own due diligence.
More in this series
Blue Moon Metals: The Complete Series
Blue Moon Metals, Part 3: The tape sold the Q1 headline, the EU already val
Blue Moon Metals, Part 2: Nussir is funded, Springer is next, and the scena
Thank you for sharing, the analysis of the company is very thorough and you have considered all scenarios, not only the ultra bull to sell the thesis.
More tungsten players in the West:
- EQ Resources, with Mt. Carbine in Australia and Barruecopardo in Spain, both mines in production.
- Tungsten West, with Hemerdon mine in the UK. Will start producing in Q3/Q4 2026.
- Almonty Industries, which you already mention in your article, several mines in production and/or development.
- American Tungsten, which will start producing in IMA Mine in Q4 2026/Q1 2027.
- Abenójar Tungsten, private company in Spain. The mine in under construction, will start production in 2027.